Introduction
The aim of this paper is to examine the role of central banks across countries by focusing on the differences in policy cultures. In fact, this is too broad an aim. To do full justice to this goal, one would need to carefully study the central banks or the mechanisms for setting monetary policy as well as provide details on the policy cultures in many countries, taking into account unique and country-specific circumstances. stability and even questions of nuclear control. And to describe the Russian 'policy culture' would be a daunting task, even when provided with a broad brush and ample canvas.
Take another example: what is the role of central banks in the newly industrialized countries of East Asia? That is, what is the role of central banks in countries such as South Korea, Indonesia, Hong Kong, or Singapore? Raising this question immediately brings to mind the 1997 Asian currency crisis, and the varying degrees to which central banks tried to defend or failed to defend a fixed exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar. One would then have to investigate the particular exchange rate regime in further detail. One would need to juxtapose the greater government control of Singapore with the laissez-faire approach in Hong Kong. One would need to talk about the exposure of firms to dollar-denominated debt, and examine the mechanism of the currency crisis in greater detail. Note: This table provides results for the ISSP question V51, On the whole, do you think it should be or should not be the government's responsibility to provide the industry with the help it needs to grow'. The fractions shown in columns 3 and 5 are the percentage of people who voted for 'Probably should not be' or 'Definitely should not be' rather than 'Definitely should be' or 'Probably should be'. Data are available for five countries, which have been 'ranked' according to these percentages. Table 4 .1 directly concerns my focus question: should the government keep down inflation or rather should it keep down unemployment? As one can see, the Australians appear to be the most hawkish with regard to inflation, while the population in Germany of 1990 favours a priority for unemployment more than all the other countries except Italy. How can this result be explained, given the well-known fact that Germany has one of the lowest and most stable inflation rates in the industrialized (p. 78 ) world? I believe the explanation lies in the endogeneity of these opinions to economic circumstances: precisely because inflation is already low and stable in Germany, while unemployment rates have been creeping up, the urgency of combating unemployment is higher than the urgency of combating inflation. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that Germany would be happy with double-digit inflation rates. Table 4 .1 provides mixed results for another reason: the trade-off presupposed in the survey question of that table may actually not exist. Indeed, I will examine the precise nature of the inflation-unemployment trade-off in detail in the bulk of this paper, and contrast a new, 'enlightened' view of monetary policy with the older Phillipscurve short-term stimulus versus long-run inflation view.
With my focus on the inflation-unemployment trade-off, I would ideally like to also examine other policy determinants of unemployment (as well as inflation). The degree to which governments pursue growth-oriented policies, work-week reduction, work-provision programmes, aids to failing industries, or the extent to which they change unemployment benefits or more generally provide structural reforms of the labour market will undoubtedly have an influence on unemployment rates and thereby indirectly on monetary policy.
A detailed analysis is, again, beyond the scope of this paper. Table 4 .2 shows that the German population more than any of the other five countries leans against the government providing growth support to its industries. One could interpret this as a laissez-faire stance: these results may come about because Germans really do favour a free-market economy. It is more likely, though, that most Germans hold a 'socialist' prejudice against profitseeking enterprises: so, rather than favouring a free-market economy, they are likely to favour heavy interference, taxation, and work regulation by the government. Some supporting evidence comes from examining Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 . According to Table 4 .3, Germans are not particularly against the government supporting declining industries, if that saves jobs. According to In sum, even these short tables, which list results for only five countries, are hard to interpret: additional information and interpretation is needed to come to meaningful conclusions. In principle, one could pursue this route further. While Collins and Giavazzi (1993) Instead, it is perhaps more elegant and more immediate to directly examine the outcome of the political process, and to examine the features of historical unemployment rates and inflation rates in a number of countries. Presumably, institutions have been designed so as to serve some public interest: it should therefore be possible to read the preferences by the voting public off policy outcomes rather than survey statistics. I will turn to such an investigation of the data in Section 2. In Section 3, I will provide a theoretical investigation, providing an underpinning and interpretation for the approach chosen in Section 2 and providing an analysis as to how much democracy central banks need, when both the public and the parliamentarians hold an 'enlightened' view of monetary policy. Section 4 contains a discussion of the results in this chapter: in particular, I shall discuss where the analysis should or could be deepened in future research. Section 5 concludes. I will argue that enlightened politicians (even if they are somewhat short-sighted) can Is there a trade-off between the mean unemployment rate and the mean inflation rate? Many students of macroeconomics may recall the famous Phillips curve and therefore be tempted to answer with 'yes'. A closer look at the data reveals that the answer is more complicated. Figure 4 .1 shows the Phillips curve for the United States, plotting yearly inflation rates over unemployment rates. As one can see, the Phillips curve looks more like a cloud rather than a systematic relationship. A simple regression of inflation on a constant and the unemployment rate can show this more formally: the R 2 of that regression is less than 2 per cent, see Table  4 .6. One needs to do something with the data before finding a trade-off between means. While one can use more sophisticated time series techniques such as vector autoregressions, a simpler and economically meaningful procedure is to plot the change of inflation rates against unemployment; see Staiger et al. (1997) . Figure 4 Unfortunately, the US provides an exception rather than a rule. It turns out that for most other countries in our sample, and also for the EU 15 countries taken as a whole, a Phillips curve of inflation over unemployment provides a better fit than a 'NAIRU curve' of the change of inflation over unemployment. The details as well as the estimated NAIRUs can be found in Table 4 .6.
Given these mixed results, I shall proceed with both a 'Phillips-curve' perspective, focusing on the level of inflation, as well as a 'NAIRU-curve' perspective, focusing on the change in the inflation rate, for all what follows, providing two sets of parallel results.
For example, Fig. 4 .3 and 4.4 provide a cross-country study of the sample mean inflation rate (resp. the sample mean of the change in the inflation rate) versus the sample mean unemployment rate. Taken as a cross section in this way, there is no particularly visible trade-off: most likely, countryspecific effects swamp any trade-off which may otherwise be visible here.
The numerical values for these means can be found in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 .7 for the 'Phillips-curve' perspective and Table 4 .11 for the 'NAIRUcurve' perspective. Figure 4 .5 shows this trade-off as it emerges from the theory 5 in Section 3. I will call this trade-off between these two volatilities a 'Taylor menu', because, to my knowledge, it was exhibited for the first time by John Taylor in a contribution to a book edited by Solow and Taylor (1998) , although it may have appeared elsewhere earlier: it certainly is an idea particularly closely associated with John Taylor. The theory in Section 3 indeed suggests that a policy maker can choose a point on this curve as if it was a 'menu': within a certain range, inflation volatility falls as unemployment volatility rises. Note that the curve in Fig.  4 .5 eventually slopes up again, i.e., for sufficiently high unemployment volatilities, the inflation volatility rises with higher unemployment volatilities. Since these volatilities are presumably undesirable, it would be rather foolish for a policy maker to find itself on this upward sloping branch. The particular numerical values of Fig. 4 .5 should not be interpreted literally: they are meant to be suggestive only. The actually feasible trade-off depends on some underlying parameters which I have made no effort at calibrating or estimating. It would be good for future research to cast more light on the quantitative magnitudes at stake: indeed, there is a large literature on the quantitative effects of monetary policy which could be utilized to that end. The numerical values for these unfiltered standard deviations σ are also in columns 4 and 5 of Table 4 .7. If one could discard the data points for Finland and Spain, there indeed would be a trade-off not much unlike the trade-off seen in Fig. 4 .5.1 do not want to push too hard here, though. Rather, I view Fig. 4 .6 as providing an interesting summary information where countries have chosen to be, given their country-specific Taylor menu. That is Fig. 4 .6 is the reflection in the data of differences in policy cultures. Some countries may favour low volatilities in unemployment, whereas other countries may favour low volatilities in inflation rates.
It is desirable to have a single number measuring this trade-off. I shall use the ratio of the standard deviations, for that. In Section 3, I will provide a further theoretical reason why this indicator is particularly interesting to look at, while I provide a further, critical discussion in Section 4. In any case, the values one obtains this way can be found in the second column of Table 4 .9. Higher values for ω indicate a desire or a policy culture, which puts more emphasis on inflation stabilization rather than output stabilization. One can use the indicator ω σ to 'rank' countries according to this trade-off: this ranking can be (p. 87 ) found in the second column of Table 4 .10. Ignoring the outliers Spain and Finland of Fig.  4 .6, one can see that the ranking list is led by Germany and the Netherlands, which are well known to be particularly hawkish on inflation. At the bottom of the list one can find Italy and Japan-again, this probably comes as no surprise. While Italy has experienced periods of rather high inflation rates (within this group of countries), Japan is quite a different case. Inflation rates in Japan have not been dramatic except for a short episode of above-20 per cent inflation at the beginning of our sample. However, their fluctuations have been larger than the corresponding unemployment fluctuations, because unemployment in Japan has traditionally always been very low and stable. While this may reflect institutional labour market features in Japan, one can reasonably debate whether these low and stable unemployment rates have been made feasible by an accommodating monetary policy in the first place: I want to put forth the proposition that this is indeed the case. In sum, it seems that ω σ is a good measure of the 'inflation hawkishness' of a country.
It is important to emphasize that there is no value judgement implicit in our ranking. Indeed, the theory of Section 3 will show that different values for ω result simply from differences in preferences. Put differently, the value for ω probably simply reflects a conscious policy choice from the Taylor menu, with different choices resulting from different but equally valid policy cultures and preferences. There certainly is no reason to lead one to interpret low ω values as some kind of policy failure at this point. One might have as easily flipped the ranking upside down: the important point here is just that this ranking (or its flipped version) provides a sorting mechanism for what countries have actually chosen to do.
Since this perspective on monetary policy is fairly new, it is worth investigating the calculation of the volatilities a bit more carefully. It is likely that the data on inflation and unemployment is driven by long-run movements which are beyond the control of monetary policy (and which are unmodelled in Section 3). For example, the expansion of the welfare state and the increasing regulation of labour markets is the probable cause for the secular increase of unemployment rates in most European countries. While monetary policy may have been the cause of short-run fluctuations in the unemployment rate, it should not be blamed for these long-run tendencies. 6
It is therefore desirable to 'filter' the fluctuations in inflation and unemployment up front. I try out three different filtering techniques. The value for all these statistics can be found in Table 4 .8 for the standard errors and in Table 4 .9 for the ω-values. For the HP-filtered volatilities, the results have also been plotted in Fig. 4 .7. A negative trade-off now appears to be visible. Again, one can (p. 88 ) use the ω's to 'rank' countries, giving rise to the remaining columns in Table 4 .10. While there are some differences between these columns, it is remarkable that they all provide more or less the same picture, with the countries known to be inflation hawks at the top and the countries known to have been relatively more concerned about ouput stabilization at the bottom. Recall that this 'ranking' should not be misconstrued to imply a value judgement. Note: The highest 'rank' is given to countries with the lowest value of ω, i.e. to the country which values a low volatility of inflation comparatively more than a low volatility of unemployment. One can do the same for a 'NAIRU' perspective, replacing inflation by its first difference in the entire analysis above. The trade-off for the simple, unfiltered volatilities (p. 90 ) across countries can be seen in Fig. 4 .8. The statistics for all four ways of calculating the volatilities are given in Tables  4.11 and 4 .12, the resulting ω-values are in Table 4 .13, and the resulting 'rankings' are in Table 4 .14.
What I found most surprising is that all columns in both ranking Tables 4.10 and 4.14 provide roughly the same picture: inflation-hawkish countries tend to be at the top, whereas countries which have not cared that much for inflation stabilization appear near the bottom (including Japan, as discussed above). I propose to the reader that ω is a surprisingly good measure of inflation hawkishness or of the differences in policy cultures, pretty much regardless of how the volatilities of inflation and unemployment are measured.
As I have repeatedly emphasized, ω should be viewed as a reflection of taste differences rather than a measure of 'good' versus 'bad' policy. This then raises the question of how a particular ω is chosen in a country. Put differently, in the game between the public, the parliament, and monetary policy, how can the public ensure that monetary policy is chosen 'optimally' from its perspective? This is the question to which I now turn.
3. How Much Democracy Does a Central Bank Need?
The Enlightened View of Monetary Policy
In this section, I wish to describe a more formal model of the democratic interaction between a central bank, politicians pressuring the central bank and the public at large. Note: The highest 'rank' is given to countries with the lowest value of ω, i.e. to the country which values a low volatility of inflation comparatively more than a low volatility of unemployment.
Ultimately, a central bank is an institution created by the constitutional process itself. In the same way, it can be dissolved. In a democracy, it is therefore unavoidable to ultimately see its raison d'etre in its service of the public interest. It is reasonable to assume that national central banks have been created and run with this objective in mind. And it is interesting to ask how much exposure central banks need to the (p. 93 ) democratic process itself. For the European Central Bank in particular, this question is of great practical interest. It is not obvious how the individual preferences of the member countries of the monetary union can and will be reflected by the policy choices of the ECB.
To analyse this issue further, I need a 'laboratory country', i.e. I need a theoretical model. I envision some country or monetary area, populated by agents with an 'enlightened' view of monetary policy, which holds that the trade-off for monetary policy is not between a current stimulus and more inflation later, but rather a trade-off between the overall volatility of inflation and the volatility of output.
I shall say more about this 'enlightened view' in a moment, but it is useful to first contrast it with an older kind of thinking. The old, outdated view of monetary policy was one of a conflict between a short-run temptation and a long-run cost. The short-run temptation was to temporarily increase output by, say, lowering interest rates. The long-run cost was the resulting inflation. Kydland and Prescott (1977) have pointed out in their celebrated analysis that this conflict leads to a perennial conflict, a perennial 'time inconsistency', of optimal plans: while it is better to commit beforehand not to yield to the temptation of temporarily increasing output, the temptation to break this commitment ex post is great. One way to get around this problem is to create independent central banks and appoint 'conservative' (Rogoff) central bankers to its helm. So, while the trade-off between a short-run stimulus and long-run inflation exists, the analysis by Kydland and Prescott (1977) shows that there is no point in trying to exploit it systematically.
It is fascinating how deeply this 'academic' argument has meanwhile been understood by the public at large, how deeply it has sunk in. While there still is the occasional politician or rare economist, who tries to push central banks into these short-run vs long-run conflicts, most others now fairly clearly understand the necessity of a commitment to a stable monetary policy environment and to avoid short-run temptations by design. There are a number of supporting pieces of evidence: I shall describe only a few:
1. The European Central Bank was built with remarkable independence and with a remarkable single-minded focus on price stability per design. This institution was not created by central bankers (although they surely were heavily consulted): it was created by elected politicians. The simplest explanation for this remarkable feat is that the Kydland-Prescott analysis has won the intellectual debates. One may ascribe this to the German public which needed to be convinced to give up its beloved mark for the new currency. But then, the German public must have strong beliefs, that a highly independent Bundesbank, committed to low inflation, has served them well: this is nothing but the In sum, while the formal details of the Kydland-Prescott analysis may not be known to many, the essence of its logic is, and is furthermore convincing for many people. Some may argue that I am overly optimistic here. Certainly, this logic does not always appear to be as sharply present as it should be and can easily be forgotten: it is the task of economists and central bankers to constantly remind the people of it and to emphasize its importance. But while adhering to this logic is not something one should too readily count on in every circumstance or for the future, it nonetheless describes the current consensus view of the public surprisingly well, in particular by comparing (p. 95 ) it to the debates of the 1970s. Likewise, whatever their rhetoric, when smart politicians are nowadays forced to make a choice, they rarely will choose in favour of permitting discretionary short-run stimuli at the pain of long-run inflation.
Instead, the discussion has been elevated to a much more subtle choice, 'enlightened' by Kydland and Prescott's analysis, focusing on a different trade-off: suppose that inflationary pressures have been forming and it is time for the central bank to do something about them. How fast should they react? Should they take a very gradual approach, avoiding sizeable burdens on the productive activities of the economy, but thereby risking a prolonged period of inflation? Or should they rush to extinguish any inflationary fires as soon as they appear, even if that means to push the economy into a recession? In summary, how should the volatility of inflation be balanced against the volatility of output? This is, indeed, a real choice, and reasonable people who fully agree with Kydland and Prescott to the need of rule-based monetary policy can reasonably differ on their assessment of this balance. There is, in essence, a menu of inflation volatilities versus output volatilities out there, from which the public and/or the policy maker can pick. This is the 'Taylor menu', already introduced above. And I shall refer to this view of the monetary policy trade-offs as the 'enlightened view of monetary policy'. 
A Model of the Problem of an Enlightened Central Banker
A small formal model may help to make this more precise. Let me start by modelling the policy choices of a single agent (think: the head of the central bank), who cares about the deviations π t of inflation at date t from some long-run target and the deviations y t from, say, full-capacity output at date t according to the quadratic utilities for some λ ≥ 0. One can read -y t as the 'output gap', which I will use below. Equivalently, one can substitute 'unemployment rate' for 'output gap'.
Obviously, the 'output gap', which we shall focus on in the theory, is not the same as the unemployment rate, which we focused on in the empirical section. Relating the two is an intricate matter, which one could pursue further in refining the analysis here. However, providing a further, detailed discussion of this distinction, and a more careful treatment of the output gap in the empirical section above (together with a discussion of the identification choices one would need to make to measure the output gap) would distract too much from the key points raised here and extend the analysis too far.
Since inflation and the evolution of economic activity are dynamic processes, I shall sum the discounted utilities to obtain a measure of overall utility, Soon, I shall describe the conflict between keeping down fluctuations in π t and fluctuations in y t , but it is already helpful to examine the particular functional form (p. 96 ) for U. Suppose that my agent could somehow reduce both inflationary variance as well as output variance to zero: the overall utility U would then achieve its global maximum. This agent will not be tempted to change inflation to gain some additional output: the linear output term which would give rise to such an 'inflationary bias' is simply missing from my specification. In other words, U reflects the enlightened view of monetary policy described above. The parameter λ is a taste parameter. Different people may have different taste parameters λ, and can therefore have different views or where to choose on the volatility-trade-off Taylor menu.
As for the dynamics of output, inflation as well as interest rates, I shall take a simple model of the variety which has become recently popular in academic as well as practical monetary policy circles. Except for some minor differences, this model has been taken practically verbatim from Svensson (1997) and, subsequently, Orphanides and Wieland (2000): I do not claim any originality at this point. Other related and prior sources are e.g. Furher and Moore (1995) or Woodford (1999) . While this model is only a crude substitute for modelling the precise way in which money and monetary policy interacts with economic activity, it shall suffice for my 'laboratory country' purpose of gaining some intuitive insights. More precisely, suppose that
where ε t and v t are mean-zero shocks, and where 0≤ϕ # 1, γ#0, , , 0≤ψ # 1 and ρ # 0 are parameters. I suppose that the central bank controls the short-term nominal interest rates r t . The second equation implies that an increase in the nominal interest rates will lower output, ceteris paribus. The first equation says that lower output will ceteris paribus lead to lower inflation. According to this model, the central bank finds itself in the need of a pact with the devil: it can influence inflation only indirectly by influencing the (negative of the) output gap y t -it does not control inflation directly. I suppose that future inflation is influenced by the current output gap. Thus, monetary policy has a more immediate effect on output rather than prices, a view which is perfectly consistent with the consensus view of research on the effects of monetary policy; see Christiano et al. (1997) . Inflation and output are both affected by a shock. I shall assume that the central bank can observe both shocks ε t and v t before setting its interest rate r t . I finally suppose that the agent starts period 0 with some current inflation π 0 at hand and some last-period output gap y -1 .
I can formulate the problem of the agent in summary by the Bellman dynamic programming equation (3) (p. 97 ) What I am looking for in particular is the optimal monetary policy rule,
telling the central bank how to pick interest rates r t given current inflation rates π t , last-periods (negative of the) output gap y t-1 , and the current output shock v t . This proposition can be proven by the method of 'guess and verify'. More precisely, substitute the form (4) into the right-hand side of Bellman's equation (3) . Take first-order conditions and calculate the envelope conditions. After some tedious calculations, the result above obtains. Alternatively, check Svensson (1997) or Orphanides and Wieland (2000) , who also derive practically the same result.
Proposition 1. There is a solution to the Bellman dynamic programming equation, given by
There are a few things to notice. First, the decision rule for interest rates takes the form of a Taylor rule; see Taylor (1993) . That is, interest rates are set to react linearly to the (deviation in) inflation and the output gap. A Taylor rule is not an exact description, though, but only holds on average, because the interest rate rule also reacts to contemporaneous news about output, i.e. it also reacts to v t . The coefficients have the expected sign: interest rates should be raised if the output deviations (the negative of the output gap) are particularly large or inflation is particularly strong. This is good (p. 98 ) news: there is fairly convincing evidence that monetary policy in practice comes close to following a Taylor rule; see Clarida et al. (1998) . Our model is certainly not unique in giving rise to a Taylor rule as the optimal (or nearly optimal) decision rule for a central bank: a survey of a variety of monetary models and their implications for Taylor rules is in Taylor (1999a,b) .
Second, one can actually bypass interest rates r t in the model above completely, and directly assume that the central bank controls y t . Even ψ then does not matter anymore. One finds that
From this, it follows that i.e. the ratios of the observed standard deviations of output and inflation yield the (negative of the) reaction coefficient of output to inflation. Indeed, this perspective was taken above, where I have taken the ratios of standard deviations as our measure of the emphasis on output stabilization: this procedure finds its theoretical justification here.
Given this model, one can therefore use data directly to determine the monetary policy rule and thus the underlying preference parameter λ, given the discount factor β and the feedback coefficients φ and γ. the mapping from β into ω and Fig. 4 .10 shows the mapping from β into α, using several different values for λ and (p. 99 ) fixing φ = 0.9, γ = 1. One can use these figures to reverse-engineer the preference parameters and the curvature parameter of the value function, given some observed volatility trade-off ω, assuming that ω has indeed been chosen to solve the optimization problem above. 1. First, suppose that λ → 0, i.e. that the agent puts negligible weight on output stabilization and essentially only cares about inflation volatility. One would then expect the agent to always fully offset any shocks to inflation, i.e. to pick ω → ϕ/γ. Indeed, the algebra above bears this out. One obtains q = 0, p = -1, and thus a = -p = 1 and ω = ϕ/γ. 2. Next, consider the case where the agent only cares about output stabilization, λ → ∞. In that case, one would expect ω → 0: shocks to inflation are never offset. The algebra above indeed yields this result, since and hence ω → 0. 3. A similar result obtains if I assume the agent to be very impatient, β → 0. In that case, he only cares about the present: since he can only affect output, but not inflation at present, he effectively only cares about output stabilization, and should set ω → 0. As above, the algebra also delivers this result.
(p. 100 ) These properties suggest that ω is a decreasing function of λ. Indeed, where is the elasticity of a with respect to λ. If this elasticity is smaller then 1, then ω -1 is an increasing function of λ, and therefore ω itself is a decreasing function of λ. I have not attempted a formal proof that this elasticity is always bounded above by 1, although it seemed true in the numerical examples I considered. I shall therefore concentrate on this case in the future.
Below, I shall consider the situation in which monetary policy is not set with ω set to the optimal value given above, but somehow chosen differently. I can then calculate the implied value function or welfare of my agent in question.
PRINTED The functions α(ω) and b(ω) are hump-shaped: they are at or near 7 the minimum at the optimal ω and increase as ω is moved further away in any direction.
The Constitutional Choice
I am now ready to examine the issue of the constitutional design of a central bank, restricting attention to a very limited set of issues, though. I want to analyse the desired degree to which a central bank should be subject to the 'pressures' by elected politicians. That is, I want to know how much democracy a central bank needs. The main case I have in mind as an application of the analysis here is the European Central Bank. The preference differences below then might translate into preference differences across countries, although they might equally well reflect differences across age groups or income groups. Finally, there is nothing particularly 'European' in this analysis: it therefore makes sense to formulate it in general terms.
I propose the following model. There are a large number of agents with different monetary policy preferences. I suppose that I can divide the population up into a large number of equally sized groups i of agents who have the same preferences (λ i ,β i ). For the numerical calculations below, it will be convenient to envision a continuum of groups, resulting in a probability distribution of (λ i ,β i ) as characterizing the population preference distribution.
There is a parliament. The parliament consists of a representative for each group, which I suppose is chosen for some other political reasons. I assume that parliamentary representatives are members of each group, except that they are more impatient than the members of the group they represent, with β i = μβ i for some 0 ≤ μ ≤ 1. One could make this more formal by envisioning some dynamic process of elections, and postulating that these representatives only care about what they can accomplish while in office, and that their chance at being re-elected is exogenously given by μ. (p. 103 ) Choosing the feedback parameter ω is the question of contention. I suppose that ω is set according to a bargain between the central bank governor and the parliament. Let ω P be the value for ω most preferred by the median representative in the parliament. Let ω CB be the value for ω most preferred by the central bank governor. With bargaining, the parameter ω is ultimately set as (7) where ν reflects the 'bargaining power' of the central bank governor. A more appealing way to read this structure is that central bank governors are subject to various pressures by democratic institutions. In practice, central bank governors are accountable for their actions, i.e. they have to explain their choice for monetary policy to parliaments and ministries. These, in turn, may choose to replace the current governor, if he or she does not choose monetary policy appropriately, or impose various other contracts. One extreme situation is a completely independent central banker, who can allow himself to completely disregard the desires by the parliament and set ω to his most preferred value: this would correspond to ν = 1. In the other extreme, the parliament retains complete control over monetary policy, with the central bank governor simply executing the mandated policy: this would correspond to ν = 0. Put differently, ν measures the degree of independence or lack of immediate democratic control of the central bank.
The question of constitutional design is the choice of ν. That is, I suppose that initially, there is a vote by the public at large on the value of ν, decided by the median voter. Which value would the median voter choose, given that ω will ultimately be decided by the bargaining process between the central bank governor and an impatient parliament, and therefore by eqn. (7)?
I will not answer this question in general, but instead I will provide an answer only for some particular choices of the parameters, using numerical calculations. These calculations are meant to be illustrative of the effects which can happen. First, suppose that the constitutional choice is a rather crude one, and that one can only decide to either have a completely independent central bank, ν = 0, or a completely controlled central bank, ν= 1. Suppose that φ = 0.9 and γ = 1. Suppose that β i ≡ β = 0.9, i.e. that all agents are equally patient. Finally, suppose that λ is exponentially distributed on [0; ∞] with some distribution parameter α, With these parameters, ω is strictly decreasing 8 in λ regardless of the discount factor β. The value ω Ρ preferred by the median voter in the parliament will therefore be chosen by the representative with the median value for λ, (p. 104 ) Recall that the discount factor for the parliamentarians is given by μβ. Finally, I suppose that the central banker is extremely conservative, and only cares about stabilizing inflation, λ CB = 0, so that ω CB = Φ/γ.
Suppose now, that some values for a and μ are given. With that and with λ median , calculate ω P . To figure out whether an agent with a preference weight λ on output stabilization would vote in favour of or against an independent central bank, ν = 0, I need to find out whether he would prefer ω = ω P or ω = ω CB . With Proposition 2 above the agent will prefer an independent central bank iff b(ω P ;λ) # b(ω P ;λ). The parameter choices are such 9 that b(ω CB ;λ) is increasing in λ and b(ω P ;λ) is decreasing in λ. There will therefore be a cutoff value λ c (α;μ), so that agents with λ # λ c (α;μ) will be in favour of an independent central bank and agents with λ # λ c (α;μ) will be in favour of a central bank controlled by a democratically elected parliament.
This, in turn, translates into vote proportions: the fraction of the population in favour of an independent central bank is given by ξ(α;μ) = 1 -exp(-αλ c (α;μ)). An independent central bank is favoured by a majority iff λ c (α;μ)# λ median (α). This will therefore be the case iff the median voter prefers an independent central bank. I believe this to be a rather generic insight of this model, although, as repeatedly emphasized, it has only been checked for the numerical values (and the particular distributional assumptions) chosen here. Figure 4 .12 shows the fraction ξ(α;μ) of the population in favour of an independent central bank, as I vary a and μ. The effects of varying μ are obvious: for low values of μ, the public rather trusts the central bank than the politicians to choose wisely: the politicians are too impatient. For larger values of μ, the public views itself better off with the politicians though. In fact, for the parameter values chosen here, the public will always be in favour of having monetary policy run by the parliament, if μ # 0.6, say. This strikes me as an interesting result: even when politicians only give a slightly better chance than 50-50 to be re-elected, the public would nonetheless prefer monetary policy to be run by them than a very conservative central banker. The reason that this result runs opposite to the usual conclusion in the literature is that everybody is assumed to have an enlightened view of monetary policy. Put differently, it is okay to entrust monetary policy to politicians, as long as they are aware that there is no point in trading off short-run output gains against long-run inflation, but rather only want to choose the 'right' variability of output versus the variability of inflation. Can politicians be that enlightened, wise and restrainted? The answer to this key question determines whether politicians should be allowed some control of monetary policy or not. Likewise, the effect of varying α is easy to understand. As α is decreased, the population shifts its preferences towards higher weights on output stabilization, away from the 'inflation stabilization only' preferences of my assumed central bank. So, one (p. 105 ) would expect this to result in increasing the preference towards running affairs by the parliament rather than the central bank. The figures show that this is indeed the case. 10 Next, I can look at a more finely attuned constitutional choice, and suppose that the negotiating weight ν can be chosen to be any number. Figure 4 .13 contains the answer. The logic here is similar to the logic in Fig. 4 .12. Again, lower values for μ and higher values for a result in higher negotiating weights for the central bank. It is interesting that the negotiating weight does not approach unity as μ →; 0: even if politicians only care about the 'here and now', the public would want to give it some weight in deciding on the course of monetary policy.
A final remark and a warning are in order. The remark is that the decision The warning is this. The analysis suggests that with an enlightened public, enlightened central bankers and, in particular, enlightened politicians, it may be quite alright to give substantial weight in monetary policy decision making to politicians (p. 106 ) rather than central bankers. However, politicians might generally not be quite as enlightened as assumed in this model. Furthermore, the parameter values are suggestive rather than carefully estimated or calibrated. A richer model which also allows for the old-view short-run temptations and whose parameters are carefully matched to the data, would be called for to analyse this issue more carefully. With that caveat in mind, I find it intriguing that a greater dose of democracy for monetary policy might not be such a bad idea after all.
Discussion
I have painted a picture with a broad brush on a large canvas: I am perfectly willing to concede that some finer details-and perhaps they are important details?-have been neglected. Let me mention a few.
First, the indicator ω is obviously crude. Inflation is not under the control of the central bank, as Blinder (1997 Blinder ( , 1998 has stressed: instead, the links between monetary policy instruments and inflation is a tenuous and everchanging one. A large part of the activity of the sizeable research staff at central banks is devoted to watching and analysing these links! This is perhaps less of a problem for our framework: in fact, the theory postulates that these autonomous shocks to inflation are the driving force of our analysis.
More importantly, much of the variability of output is probably not related to monetary policy at all. Cochrane (1994) has shown that no more than 20 per cent of (p. 107 ) output variation can be explained by monetary policy shocks. Cochrane's conclusion is the subject of some debate (see e.g. Faust 1998; Uhlig 1998), but does enjoy a fairly broad support in the research community. Is this a problem for the proposed indicator ω? And, if so, how could one take account of that?
In order to analyse this issue, one needs to take a closer look. First, according to our theory, there are no monetary policy shocks at all: instead, interest rates are set as a deterministic function of current inflation, lastperiods output gap, and current output shocks. Applying standard VAR techniques in this economy to, say, a three-variable VAR in inflation, the output gap and interest rates, and correctly identifying the shocks would show that monetary policy shocks explain zero per cent of the output variation, which is perfectly in line with Cochrane's (1994) observation. The influence of monetary policy in our model is thus a subtler one, and lies in the systematic part of the monetary policy rule. Shifting the focus of attention away from monetary policy shocks and to this systematic part of the monetary policy rule in understanding the role of monetary policy for output fluctuations is a recent advance in the literature on monetary policy and has been stressed e.g. by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) . My analysis is following the spirit of theirs.
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the systematic part of monetary policy could so perfectly offset inflation and output shocks as postulated here. This is likely to explain a sizeable part of the cross-country variation in our indicator ω: the special situation of Finland during 1991 and 1992 provides an interesting case, for example. Therefore, to fully understand and analyse the volatility trade-offs faced by a central bank, one needs to distinguish between the part of output and inflation volatility which is subject to change versus not subject to change, if the systematic part of monetary policy is varied. This, in turn, requires a full-fledged dynamic general equilibrium analysis of the economy, and an econometric methodology which allows the identification of the parts in question, given such a theoretical analysis. One then needs to apply this framework to each country in question and trace out the frontier of possibilities, preferably analysing them in terms of welfare of individual agents rather than the derivative concepts of volatilities in output and inflation. It is fair to say that the literature is still embarrassingly far from having developed convincing models with a broad consensual support, which would permit such an analysis. Attempting such an analysis here would be far beyond the scope of this chapter. But it is clear where one needs to go. This chapter and the proposed indicator ω are meant to be a simple step in that direction. In this chapter, I have investigated the role of national central banks and of different policy cultures, concentrating the focus on the question of the trade-off between unemployment and inflation in a selection of industrialized countries. The traditional literature has emphasized the trade-off between the level of inflation versus the level of the unemployment rate in the Phillips-curve perspective or the change in the inflation rates versus the level of the unemployment rate in the 'NAIRU' perspective. Kydland and Prescott (1977) have shown in their seminal contribution that these tradeoffs, even if present, should not be exploited: the result will only be higher inflation (or an acceleration of inflation) without any systematic change in unemployment rates. This conclusion is now so firmly embedded in the minds of central bankers and the enlightened public, that battles along those lines have become rather harmless rarities, and are only fought by politicians with long-outdated views. The last one was the fight in 1998 between the German Finance Minister Lafontaine, arguing for lowering interest rates based on a Phillips-curve view, and the Bundesbank, insisting on maintaining its excellent reputation instead. The battle was decisively won by the Bundesbank: Lafontaine eventually felt compelled to resign from all his political function; see Lafontaine (1999) .
The modern, 'enlightened' point of view of monetary policy instead emphasizes a trade-off between the long-run volatility of inflation and the long-run volatility of unemployment. According to this 'enlightened' view, there is a 'Taylor menu', from which policy makers can choose. Different choices reflect differences in policy culture, interpreted as differences in the weight attached to output stabilization vis-à-vis inflation stabilization. I have provided an empirical cross-country analysis of the choices individual countries have made along this Taylor menu. I have introduced the ratio ω of the volatility in unemployment rates to the volatility in inflation rates as a single indicator to measure the stance of a country. A high value for ω indicates an inflation-hawkish country-examples are Germany and the Netherlands-whereas a low value of ω indicates a country which values unemployment stabilization over inflation stabilization-Italy and Japan are two examples, although for different reasons. It turns out that an ordering of countries based on ω can be established, which is fairly robust to the exact way of how the inflation volatilities and output volatilities are measured. I propose that ω is a sensible measure of the cultural differences between countries along this key dimension of monetary policy. The indicator ω is in turn related to the speed at which monetary policy reacts to inflationary developments. This speed therefore is the key parameter of choice in monetary policy, and one on which reasonable people can disagree depending on their preferences. I have investigated how the value for this speed parameter ω, which is preferred by an enlightened voting public, can be implemented by monetary policy through the appropriate design of the institutions. I have shown that it may be reasonable to give more democratic control of monetary policy back to (impatient) parliamentarians, as long as they are not too impatient and as long as it can be assured that they hold and follow an 'enlightened' view of monetary policy rather than cling to the (p. 109 ) outdated Lafontaine-style perspective of an exploitable Phillips-curve (or NAIRU-curve) trade-off see Lafontaine (1999) .
We therefore cautiously propose that the issue of democratic control of monetary policy should be reopened to debate. While completely independent central banking was surely a necessity in the past, this concept may now likewise become a relic of the past as the 'enlightened' view gradually takes hold, provided the public and the parliamentarians indeed increasingly understand the value of not yielding to short-run temptations. The issue to be voted upon would be ω, the speed at which to adjust to inflationary developments. The question of increasing democratic control should become of particular interest for the European Central Bank in the future, as it will be particularly hard for the ECB to aggregate diverse national preferences with regard to monetary policy, but it will also be relevant everywhere else, as central banks increasingly view themselves as institutions designed by the constitutional process to serve the public interest.
The most obvious danger in this proposal is the risk that the 'enlightened' consensus is too tenuous or too fragile, and that it may be dangerous to build institutions of democratic control by relying on a firmly established 'enlightened' view. Certainly, economists and central bankers alike should never cease in their efforts of reminding the public and the politicians of the compelling logic of this view. The meta-agenda of this chapter is to do precisely that.
